(a) Concept of a Deed
The legal concept of a 'deed' was unknown to Anglo-Saxon law. Indeed, the making of any legal document was rare -given the high rates of illiteracy. Thus, writing was restricted to the king and a few clerics and magnates. Further, they did not 'sign' a legal document as we understand it today. That is, by writing their signature. Instead, they put their 'mark' on it. Usually, in the form of a cross which was placed beside a clerk's subscription of their name. 25  With the arrival of the Normans after the Norman Conquest (1066), any writing (latin, carta) was called a 'charter'. These became categorised into royal charters (also, called diplomas) and private charters (i.e. legal documents executed by private individuals);
26
 Gradually, the word 'charter' became a word used to describe a writing executed by the monarch only. As a result, the word 'deed' (in ordinary parlance, the word referred to an 'act' or 'fact') 27 came into its own. It referred to a writing -invariably on parchment (paper did not come into England until the 14 th century) that was sealed and delivered. Thus, a deed was a type of legal document -a description of a particular legal 'act' ;  As to when the word 'deed' became recognised, and commonly used, in legal terminology, this was probably c.1290-1300. Further, there was nothing complicated about it. If the Normans could have signed their name, a 'deed' would have been a reference to a signed writing, the signature being evidence of a party agreeing to be legally bound -save for the additional requirement of delivery (see below);  As for the seal, the Normans introduced the seal from ecclesiastical practice. At first, the seal was restricted to the king and powerful nobles. However, by c. 1166, lesser magnates were using it. And, by 1290, it was ubiquitous among wealthier people and merchants. 28 Thus, the deed was the same as any other writing in early medieval times save for the requirement of delivery. In short, a deed was a particular type of legal document. One which also required delivery to be effective. If not it was a mere escrow or escrowl (a writing, albeit sealed). 29 As for this prerequisite of delivery -and its purposive element -one needs go back into Biblical times for an explanation. In order to avoid fraud (and disputes), all transactions -to have legal validity -had to be 'ceremonial' (that is, formal) in nature. Thus, a person physically handed over the object in question -or a token to represent the same (such as a shoe in the case of land) -to another, in order to effect a legal transaction such an exchange, sale or gift. This occurred in the presence of witnesses. This delivery (livery) of possession (seisin) was essential so that everyone could see (and remember) that someone had conveyed title to another. Formulaic words were also employed. 30 A failure to satisfy these formal requirements invalidated (voided) the transaction. This process also applied in AngloSaxon law -doubtless, because their law was, mainly, written by clerics who were familiar with Biblical law. Thus, there was physical (or representational) delivery with formulaic words and witnesses. 31 However, postConquest, as the English population and commerce increased, physical attendance by the contracting parties (and witnesses) became more onerous and this impacted on the need for the physical delivery of the object in question (land, goods etc).
 Incorporeal Hereditaments. 32 Thus, in Norman times, agents were used to stand in for the contracting parties, starting with the king and spreading downwards in society (this producing the power of attorney). Further, it was inevitable with incorporeal hereditaments that the delivery of a legal 25 See McBain Deeds, n 1, pt 1, p 20 and McBain Consideration, n 1, pt 1, p 37. 26 Thus, Glanvill (c. 1189), n 7, in the first English legal text, distinguished a royal charter from a private one (he called the latter a chirographic charter), see McBain Deeds, n 1, pt 1, p 16. So did Bracton (c. 1250), Ibid. Both, also, referred to a charter being sealed by its maker. 27 McBain Deeds, n 1, pt 1, pp 16 & 33. 28 See McBain Deeds, n 1, pt 1, p 20 and McBain Consideration, n 1, pt 1, p 45, fn 418 (referring to a trial c. 1154). The seal of another could be used if one did not have one of one's own, see McBain Deeds, n 1, pt 1, p 21 and p 40, n 167. 29 Ibid, p 23 referring to Paston JCP in a case in 1431 'It is nothing more than an escrow unless he delivers the deed to him.' See alsoBlackstone, n 13, vol 2, pp 305-6 'the Normans, a brave but illiterate nation...used the practice of sealing only, without writing their names: which custom continued, when learning made its way among them, though the reason for doing it had ceased...At the conquest, the Norman lords brought over into their kingdom their own fashions; and introduced waxen seals only, instead of the English method of writing their names, and signing with the sign of the cross.' 30 See McBain Consideration, n 1, pt 1, pp 17-25. 31 Ibid, pp 34-41. See also GS McBain, Modernising the Law of Gift (2016) International Law Research, vol 5, no 1, p 172. 32 Incorporeal hereditaments comprise things such as advowsons, tithes, commons, ways, offices, dignities, corrodies or pensions, annuities and rents. See Blackstone, n 13, vol 2, p 21. Also, McBain Deeds, n 1, pt 1, p 33.
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Vol. 8, No. 1; 2019 5 document would be treated as sufficient to the transfer of title to the same since they had no physical element. As aresult, the transfer (conveyance) of a sealed writing was sufficient by the time of Britton (c.1290) to constitute the transfer (conveyance) of an incorporeal hereditament; 33  Personalty. By legal extension, it was, then, accepted by the English courts that personalty could be transferred by deed. This had occurred by 1385; 34  Land. In the case of land, change took much longer so great was the time honoured custom of land being physically transferred. That is, the landowner on (or in view of) the land physically transferring his title to another in the presence of witnesses, by handing over possession (seisin) of it pursuant to a ceremony. 35 Thus, handing over a deed of title was -at first -no more than additional evidence of the transfer of title physically. Then, the English courts permitted evidence of legal acts (private agreements) concerning land (fines, final concords or agreements) to be recorded in the court rolls, post-1195. And, they were prepared to recognise such evidence 'on the record' as being of especial evidential value for judicial purposes. 36 Recognition of the 'deed' as a legal concept enabled English law to take this one stage further. In time, the courts (or legislation) recognised that land could be validly transferred by employing devices which did not involve physical delivery, such as uses, bargain and sale, lease and release etc.
In conclusion, the legal concept of a deed was a sealed writing on parchment (or paper) which became effective on delivery.
(b) Definition of a Deed
When the term 'deed' (factum in latin and fait, fet in Anglo-Norman) was first employed in legal terminology to define a sealed writing that had been delivered by one party to another, is unclear. Such would have been gradual. 37 Pollock and Maitland hypothesised that the technical use of the word 'deed' was the outcome of the common plea non est factum meum ('I did not execute that document'). 38 This would seem likely since the parchment, as sealed, was evidential -something to plead in court viz. that the maker had executed it, thereby, accepting that it was his legal act and that he was legally bound. Likely, this had occurred by 1290. 39 In 1444, Fulthorpe JCP made it clear that a deed ('fait') required writing, sealing and delivery 40 as did Rastell in 1527, 41 Perkins in 1532 42 and Goodard's Case (1584). 43 Coke (in 1628) stated an oft quoted definition of a deed:
33 Britton (trans Nichols, 1865), vol 1, p 366 'But for the purchase of these franchises [i.e. incorporeal tenements] the same formality of giving seisin is not requisite, as in purchases of corporeal things. For if the parties are agreed, the delivery of the deeds together with the view of the tenements in the presence of neighbours is sufficient.' See also McBain Deeds, n 1, pt 1, p 33, n 38. 34 McBain Consideration, n 1, pt 2,p 50 citing J Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (Reed, 4 th ed, 2002),p 384 'by the end of the fourteenth century a gift of chattels could be effected by deed.' Baker cited Pynchoun v Geldeford (1385) YB Hil 8 Ric II (Ames Foundation, 1987), p 215. 35 See McBain Deeds, n 1, pt 1, pp 20-1. For the ceremony under early Scots law, see Ars Notariatus, n 1, pp 56, 67 & 75 (delivery of earth and stone to symbolize the land or entry through the door of the house). 36 Blackstone, n 13, vol 3, p 331 'as Sir Edward Coke observes, a record or enrollment is a monument of so high a nature, and importeth in itself such absolute verity, that if it be pleaded that there is no such record, it shall not receive any trial by witness, jury, or otherwise, but only by itself. ' 39 Ibid, p 220. P & M thought that, by the late 13 th century, 'by a deed (fet, factum) men are beginning to mean a sealed piece of parchment…The sealing and delivering of the parchment is the contractual act.' Also, 'As a word which will stand for the document itself, it slowly surplants carta; it is thus used in YB 33-5 Edw 1 [1305-7], p 331: 'nous avoms vostre fet.' The Statute of Gloucester 1278 used the word 'fet' to refer, in translation, to a 'fact', 'act', 'deed', see c. 9 ('ou le fait fuist fait', where the act was done), See also Coke, n 36, vol 2, p 317. 40 22 Hen 6 pl 33 fo 45a-46a (1444), Seipp no 1444.033 per Fulthorpe JCP, 'The defendant has pleaded only the delivery of an escrow because if the deed is to be [will be] effective he must have a sealed writing and delivery of the deed' ('le defendant en effect ad monster forsque livere d'un escrow, car s'il sera effectual fait il doit aver escript enseale et deliverie de le fait.'). 41 These new (and rather idiosyncratic) definitions confused the prior concept prevailing since the medieval agesthat a deed was a sealed writing on parchment (or paper) that was delivered. The result was confusion as regards the definition of a deed.
In conclusion, the definition of a deed changed over time.
(c) Change to the Nature of the Prerequisites of a Deed
As well as changes to the definition of a deed -over the centuries -major changes occurred to the prerequisites of delivery and sealing. Also, the need for the writing to be on parchment or paper. Thus:  Delivery. There was a gradual diminution in the need for actual delivery leading to the same becoming a legal fiction. By the 16 th century, the fact of delivery did not have to be stated in the deed, as noted in Goddard's Case (1584). 50 Later, delivery became constructive. 51 This is explicable by reason of the fact that the need for the deed to represent physical delivery was in decline since -even in the case of land -it was no longer required. Transfer (that is, livery or delivery) of seisin (possession) was superceded by more commercially convenient forms of title transfer. The death knell for the prerequisite of delivery was the Real Property Act 1845. It enacted that, in future, corporeal hereditaments were to lie in grant and not by way of livery of seisin. As Alexander noted, this was a decisive break with the past and it meant that the delivery of a deed was now an otiose prerequisite.
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As it was -even before this date -the courts had reduced 'delivery' as a prerequisite for a 44 Coke, n 36, vol 1, s 40 & vol 2, s 259 (Co Litt 35b, 171b). See also Blackstone, n 13, vol 2, p 295 'a deed is a writing sealed and delivered by the parties. It is sometimes called a charter, carta, from its material; but most usually, when applied to the transactions of private subjects, it is called a deed, in latin factum…because it is the most solemn and authentic act that a man can possibly perform, with relation to the disposal of his property.' See McBain, n 1, pt 1, p 17. 45 LR 2 CCR 22 at p 27 per Bovill CJ 'In some of the definitions given a deed is described as being something of the nature of a contract. But the term is clearly not confined to contracts.' See also McBain, n 1, pt 1, p 34, n 59. 46 Styl 459. 47 49 See n 45, p 27 per Bovill CJ 'any instrument delivered as a deed, and which either itself passes an interest or property, or is in affirmance or confirmation of something whereby an interest or property passes, is a deed.' This definition failed to cover a release. See McBain Deeds, n 1, pt 1, p 18 and pp 34-5. See also Halsbury, n 1, vol 32, para 201 which lists other legal documents which -although sealed -have been held not to be deeds. There is little (no) legal consistency to them. 50 2 Co Rep 4b (76 ER 396)'delivery is as necessary to the essence of a deed, as the putting of the seal to it, and yet it need not be contained in the deed that it was delivered. And note, the order of making a deed is, first to write it, then to seal it, and after to deliver it: and therefore it is not necessary that the sealing or delivery be mentioned in the writing, for as much as they are to be done after. And so, it was said, it was resolved in Henry the Eighth's time [i.e. 1509-47].' See also McBain Deeds, n 1, pt 1, p 29. 51 Coke, n 36, vol 1, s 40 (Co Litt 36a)(in 1628) 'as a deed may be delivered to the party without words, so may a deed be delivered by words without any act of delivery, as if the writing sealed lieth upon the table, and the feoffor or obligor saith to the feoffee or obligee, Go and take up the said writing, it is sufficient for you, or it will serve the turn; or Take it as my deed, or the like words, it is sufficient delivery.' See also deed to a fiction, it only being a matter now of intention. 53 Thus, by this stage (1826), delivery should have been dispensed with since it had served its purpose. As it was, a conclusive presumption as to the delivery of a deed arose both at common law and in legislation; 54  Sealing. The seal was to cope with the inability of the Normans to sign. However, by the time of Henry VIII (1507-49), people were beginning to sign and this became the norm by Victorian times, if not before. Further, the seal attached to the parchment (or paper) had always been nominal since it replaced a person physically handing over his personal seal (signet) each time he effected a legal transaction, to evidence his being legally bound. 55 Being nominal in nature (reflecting the intention to be legally bound), a seal could be any shape, size or colour. It could also be plain and plain wafer seals (often, coloured red) were in widespread use from the 1840's. Thus, by this time, the seal should have been abolished and the signature recognised as being sufficient for a deed. As it was, the courts came to accept that any evidence of a seal was sufficient -including just employing the word 'sealed'. Also, a conclusive presumption of sealing arose both at common law and in legislation (as had occurred in the case of delivery, see above); 56  Parchment. This prerequisite (arising from judicial decision c. 1562) was obsolete by Victorian times when paper replaced parchment in commercial usage. However, it was not until the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) 1989 that the prerequisite of parchment or paper was abolished.
In conclusion, the key prerequisites for a deed -parchment, sealing and delivery -had become obsolete by 1845 (Real Property Act 1845).
(d) Opaque Definition of a Deed
As noted previously (see (b) ), confusion arose as to what was a deed since -even though a writing was on paper and parchment and sealed and delivered -some deeds were not treated as such, but merely as sealed instruments.
The result was that it became difficult to define a deed -a point noted in standard texts on the same by Elphinstone (in 1884) and by Norton (in 1906 55 The Romans employed the same method, formally handing over a ring (sent with a slave) to confirm the conclusion of a legal transaction. Also, for the institution of an heir, the testator gave a ring, see Ars Notariatus, n 1, p 138. 56 McBain Deeds, n 1, pt 1, p 26. In Re Sandilands (1871) LR 6CP 411, 413 the mere indication of a seal, a ribbon coupled with evidence of delivery by the maker as his deed, was sufficient. In Re Balkis (1888) 58 LT 300 a circle round the words 'place for seal' probably sufficed. In Commercial Services v Knowles (1978) [1978] CLY 794 it was held that the words 'signed, sealed and delivered' performed the same function as a seal. In TCB v Gray [1986] Ch 621 a deed stating that it had been sealed, was held to have created an estoppel even though it had not been sealed. See McBain Deeds, n 1, pt 1, p 26 & 46. 57 See McBain Deeds, n 1, pt 1, p 17. Norton hazarded the following definition 'A writing (i) on paper, vellum or parchment, (ii) sealed and (iii) delivered, whereby an interest, right, or property passes, or an obligation binding on some person is created, or which is in affirmance of some act whereby an interest, right or property has passed. ' Ibid. 58 The Law Commission defined a deed as: 'A written instrument which is executed with the necessary formality, and by which an interest, right, or property passes or is confirmed, or an obligation binding on some person is created or confirmed.' See McBain Deeds, n 1, pt 1, p 18. However, this is opaque since a written instrument is the same as a legal document. Thus, the latter expression is simpler. Further 'with the necessary formality' fails to state what is actually required. The remainder of the definition derives from Bovill CJ (see n 49). See also Halsbury, n 1, vol 32, para 201 'it must express that the person or corporation so named makes, confirms, concurs in or consents to some assurance (otherwise than by way of testamentary disposition) of some interest in property or of some legal or equitable right, title, or claim, or undertakes or enters into some obligation, duty or agreement enforceable at law or in equity, or does or concurs in some other act affecting the legal relations or position of a party to the instrument or of some other person or corporation.'
(e) Current Position & Complexity
Reform to the law on deeds was slow in coming. Recognition of the signature occurred in 1925 with it being a requirement that an individual must sign an instrument (or have another sign it on his behalf) in order to make it a deed. 59 And, since the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, a deed is no longer required to be sealed by an individual. In 1983, the Law Commission (in a Working Paper) provisionally recommended the abolition of delivery as a prerequisite, on the basis that it could be a 'dangerous misnomer'. 60 However, this did not occur -a pity, since this would have meant that there was, in reality, no difference between a deed and any other legal document (save for the archaic use of a seal). The requirement that a deed must be on parchment or paper was removed by the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989. This, also, should have been the opportunity to abolish deeds. Yet, the Law Commission (effectively) preserved the deed by recommending two new prerequisites -a deed had to: (i) make it clear on its face that it was such (a 'face value test'); and (ii) in the case of an individual, that it had to be attested.
 However, these new prerequisites were, simply, makeweights to prevent deeds being no different to specialities or to any other sealed instrument (writing);  Further, (i), in effect, contradicted the general proposition of law that is for the courts to legally categorise the nature of a legal document and not the maker. 61 Further, declaring a document to be a deed does not, necessarily, make it so in law. 62 This new requisite also reversed the position at common law and in the Law of Property Act 1925, s 57 (description of deeds) in which a deed did not have to state on its face that it was such;  As for, (ii), the prerequisite of attestation could result in a valid legal document being rendered invalid by a formal requirement. As a result, in Shah v Shah (1982) , the Court of Appeal ignored this prerequisite (see 10(c)).
The result of all this historical confabulation is that most lawyers (and judges) -and certainly all laymen -when considering the law of deeds, might be tempted to exclaim'this sames a labyrinth'. Indeed, it is, since there is:  no generally accepted definition;
 the legal distinctions between a deed, a speciality and a sealed instrument are unclear;
 when a legal document must be way of deed at common law or pursuant to legislation is complex, confusing and inconsistent; 63 and  there are (at least) 7 different means of executing a deed -depending on whether it is made by: (i) an individual; (ii) a corporation sole; (iii) a company under the Companies Acts (or an unregistered company); (iv) a foreign company; (v) another form of corporation aggregate; (vi) a limited liability partnership; (vii) the palatinate (and the duchy) of Lancaster and the duchy of Cornwall.
(f) Abolishing Deeds
The argument for abolishing deeds is predicated on the essential fact that a deed is, at base, no different to any other legal document save that it preserves the need for a seal (other than for individuals). However, the seal has been replaced in general social and commercial use by the signature for, at least, 150 years. Further -even in the case of legal persons -the present tendency, today, is to sign as opposed to seal. Thus, if the seal is abolished, so too, should the legal concepts of deeds and specialties since their continuing raison d'être relates to the seal as the key feature which distinguishes them from other legal documents. Abolishing deeds would also remove a vast quantity of confused and anomalous law. Further, it would help make the law more consistent since many writings intended to have legal effect which -one would think the law would require to be made by way of deed However, if deeds are abolished, it needs to be considered whether any benefits accorded to them should be extended to other legal documents. This, to forestall any complaint that some legal benefit is being 'lost' in some way if deeds no longer exist. Such is now considered.
(g) Benefits of a Deed
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 Merger. If a debtor enters into a deed (or a specialty) to secure a debt (or other obligation) owed by him under a simple contract, the remedy under the latter merges into the superior remedy under the deed (or specialty). However, for this to happen: (i) the security must be taken in respect of the same obligation; (ii) it must be of higher efficacy; (iii) the transaction must be between the same parties; and (iv) the parties must, generally, intend merger to occur (this rarely happens since their intention is not focused on the same). Today, the only real benefit of merger is an extended limitation period (see below). another form of writing. In particular, a party to a deed might be estopped to a greater extent. The problem with so many of these (arcane) rules for the interpretation of deeds was that they arose from historical events and they had little (or no) reference to modern commercial and social realities. Nor, indeed, to common sense. The death knell to retaining a separate set of rules is the decision of the
House of Lords in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich
Building Society (1998) in which the House recognised that the old 'intellectual baggage' of interpretation in respect of deeds had been discarded. 69 Today, those rules of interpretation for deeds that remain 70 and which are useful now apply to legal documents in general. Thus, if deeds are abolished, abolition of rules on their interpretation would result in no loss.
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One would suggest that two of the above (merger and interpretation) are minor and that a review of them would not take much time. Further, the benefits they bring (in practice) are small. The Limitation Act 1980 point is also minor and the limitation period for deeds should now be consistent with simple contracts (whether by increasing the time period in the case of the latter or decreasing that in the case of the former).
 Privity. The common law rule was that, generally, a contract could not confer rights (or impose obligations) on a person not party to it. This was affected by the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. Abolition of deeds would improve the position re privity, since the position in respect of deeds is old and obscure. 72 However, to avoid any allegation that something is being lost, privity -as applied to 65 Thus, wills have never had to be by way of deed even though, given their nature one would assume that they should be accorded the highest degree of formality. Absolute bills of sale do not have to be by way of deed (cf. security bills). deeds -could be extended to legal documents in general where the same would, otherwise, have applied in respect of a deed;  Consideration. A deed imports (i.e. gives rise to a presumption of) consideration, a prerequisite for a contract. The need for consideration (a prerequisite not found in civil legal systems) has been much disputed and it (likely) should be abolished. 73 Further, as long ago as 1765 (Pillans v Van Mierop), Mansfield CJ sought to apply the doctrine of consideration to any legal writing since the doctrine, at base, is a matter of evidence -an intention to be bound as a result of paying, or receiving, money or money's worth. 74 However, in the interim -to avoid any allegation that something is being lost -the presumption of consideration -as applied to deeds -should be extended to any legal document (of even greater clarity would be to define a contract and its prerequisites, omitting the need for consideration).
One would suggest that the issue of consideration is also a minor point. And, that privity should now apply to any legal document since the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 has done this for contracts.
In conclusion, deeds are well past their 'sell-by' date. Obscure, confused and confusing the only grounds for their present retention relate to the supposed benefits they bring. At most, these are 4 (see (g) 
SPECIALTIES & SEALED INSTRUMENTS (a) Nature of a Specialty
As noted elsewhere, 76 under English law, the concept of a specialty -and its relationship with a deed -has always been unclear, despite having a long historical pedigree. There would seem to be various possibilities as to the meaning of a 'specialty' viz. that it is:
 a type of deed. In particular, one evidencing a debt;
 an instrument under seal. That is, a speciality is an instrument under seal;
 a generic reference which refers both to a deed and to an instrument under seal; 77  a distinct legal concept.
Blackstone (in 1766) seems to have treated a specialty as a type of deed -one acknowledging a contractual debt 78 (although this is not wholly clear since he also referred to an instrument under seal and such is not identical to a deed). 79 If so, a speciality is one and the same as a deed. At least, in most instances, which is how it has been tended to be treated by legal writers and the Law Commission in later times. 80 Thus, in 1998, the Law Commission recommended that it should be made clear that -for an instrument to be a specialty at common law -it must be a deed.
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 However, it seems that a speciality is not the same as an instrument under seal. Thus, an award is not a specialty since it does not evidence a debt. Instead, an instrument under seal would cover an award as well as warrants of justices, sub-poenas, a licence under seal to use a patent etc; 82 73 3 Burr 1663 (97 ER 1035), See also McBain Consideration, n 1, pt 2, p 34 and McBain Deeds, n 1, pt 2, pp 6-7. 74 Sometimes, it is asserted that a deed imports (presumes) consideration and, sometimes, that the formality of a deed estops a party to the deed from asserting a lack of consideration. However, at base, both are the same. It was not the deed (the writing) that was the relevant point. It was the formality of the seal. The seal (or a signature) evinced the intention to be bound which a party should not be, later, entitled to gainsay. 75  In times past, a sealed tally (a tally being on wood) was not treated as a deed, even if there was writing on it, since the writing was not held to be sufficiently permanent in contrast to a deed which was on parchment. 83 However, a sealed tally was treated as a specialty -lending credence to a specialty being (in times past) a distinct legal concept;  Further, the requirement that a deed must state that it is such on its face (introduced since 1989) means that specialties must still exist, since specialties by statute do not have to do so. 84 Further, a debt contained in an instrument under seal made by an individual which is not attested is not a deed. However, it could be a specialty, if the latter is a distinct legal concept.
In conclusion, it is better to treat (out of caution) a specialty as a distinct legal concept which refers to a debt contained in a legal document under seal, not otherwise satisfying the requirements of a deed.
(b) Benefits of a Specialty
The benefits of a specialty were, also, not necessarily coterminous with those of a deed since specialty creditors -in the estate of a deceased person -were accorded a priority (this, only concerning debts and deeds can cover things other than debts). Such a benefit has now been abolished. Specialties would seem to have the benefit of a deed re a limitation period 85 and merger. However, if not deeds, they would not (necessarily) be interpreted the same as deeds. Their benefits in respect of consideration and privity are unclear, although both are likely vis-avis contract debts.
(c) Sealed Instrument
Regardless of the nature (and continued existence) of a specialty, instruments under seal still exist. For example, a legal document that does not otherwise match the prerequisites for a deed (for example, it does not the 'face value' requirement) would be an instrument under seal. So too, warrants of justices, sub-poenas, a licence under seal to use a patent etc, all of which are not deeds (and not specialties since they do not evidence debts).
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Instruments under seal do not, necessarily, have the benefits of a deed or a specialty.
(d)Conclusion
While the law on deeds is opaque, that on specialities is even more so. However, it would seem clear thatanalysing specialties or instruments under seal -is not necessary to any great degree or depth since if a deed is abolished, so should they since they are treated as synonymous with a deed today in most instances. Further, if instruments under seal are abolished (or if the seal is abolished) so should all three since deeds, specialties and instruments under seal are linked by the common need for a seal. Thus, further analysis of the intricacies of specialties and instruments under seal is of little benefit.
In conclusion, specialties and sealed instruments -like deeds -should be abolished.
SEALING LEGAL DOCUMENTS
In 1971, a legal luminary and member of the House of Lords, Lord Wilberforce stated:
Sealing is a completely fictitious matter...I would have hoped that we might have got rid of that mumbo-jumbo and aligned ourselves with most other civilised countries. 89 Lord Wilberforce stated this more than 45 years ago. Had the seal been dispensed with in 1971, it would have saved even more complex law being developed with the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, which legislation further complicated matters. As it is, today, individuals no longer seal as a legal requirement and most legal persons do not do so as a matter of practice. Further, as Lord Wilberforce stated, the seal is now a legal fiction. None needs be attached to the legal document; it is enough if the legal document states 'sealed'. 85 See the definition in the Limitation Act 1980, s 8. 86 The fact that a specialty has a different conflict of laws rule vis-a-vis the situs of debts cannot be regarded as a benefit. 87 See ns 46-9. 88 They would, likely, have the benefit of an extended limitation period under the Limitation Act 1980, s 8, being treated as a 'specialty' for such purposes. Not being deeds as such, they would not be interpreted as deeds, nor would the rules of privity vis-à-vis deeds apply. Being sealed, the seal would import consideration. Merger would be of little relevance. 89 Given this, there would seem to be an overwhelming case to accept the reality of the signature and to abolish the sealing of legal documents together with the legal concepts of a deed and a specialty.
(a) Consequences -Individuals & Corporations Sole
Individuals no longer seal. 91 What of corporations sole, however ? For corporations sole, in order to make a deed, the legal document must: (i) satisfy the face value requirement and be; (ii) in writing; (iii) sealed; and (iv) delivered -since no provision was made in the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 for a signature instead of a seal.
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 However, corporations sole are all individuals. They comprise a person and his (or her) successors in some office (or station) who are incorporated in law and they are created by charter or statute. 93 Thus, the formalities for individuals and corporations sole should be identical including the abolition of the need for a seal;  As it is, abolishing the seal for corporations sole -and making provision for signing -would not appear to be problematic. There appear to be less than 50 types of corporation sole. In conclusion, the seal should be abolished for corporations sole. 98 The only exception should relate to where the great seal (or the privy seal) applies in the case of the Crown (see (e) ).
(b) Consequences -Corporations Aggregate
In 1998, the Law Commission considered the abolition of the seal in the context of the Companies Act 1985, s 36A. 99 It listed 4 advantages of execution under the seal, viz.
(i) a seal might offer a 'greater guarantee of authenticity' than execution by the signature of two officers alone;
(ii) a company may make arrangements for the custody (and use) of the common seal which will assist in controlling the obligations it enters into by deed;
(iii) a seal may assist where documents are to be used abroad in a jurisdiction which requires execution under seal;
(iv) a seal can be more flexible than execution by the signature of one or two officers since the company may extend the range of persons authorised to attest the sealing (or dispense with attestation entirely).
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However, none of these have weight today, as to:  (i), a plain seal -or the word 'sealed' -offers less authenticity that the signature of two officers, since the latter can be identified and a graphologist can opine on whether the signatures are authentic; 90 Abolishing the seal removes, ipso facto, the legal concept of an instrument under seal. However, separately abolishing deeds and specialties is needed since both now cover instances where a seal is not used e.  (ii), most off-the-shelf companies are tiny affairs using no seal as such (or, if so, they attach a wafer or put the statement 'sealed');  (iii), many foreign jurisdictions do not require execution under seal;  (iv) attestation is not the same as sealing and it can apply to a signature as well as a seal.
As it is, today, most corporations aggregate are not required to have a common seal or legislation permits them to sign as opposed to seal. 101 Further, common law and statutory presumptions of sealing and due execution seem to (clearly) evidence that legislation -and the English courts -have developed an over-arching principle that a corporation aggregate should not be able avoid legal documents on the basis of its formal requirements for execution. Not least, since they are responsible for them.
102 Thus, it is asserted that the seal should be abolished. If so, and the signature is employed instead, it needs to be considered whether two -or just one -designated officer is required. The latter may stem from Biblical grounds 103 and, today, one signature can be used for a foreign corporation where no local law provides otherwise. It is suggested that one signature might be sufficient. 
(c) Partnerships
In the case of a limited liability partnership (LLP), at present, the legal document must make it clear on its face that it is a deed. It must also be sealed with the common seal (or signed by two members of the LLP) and delivered. If the instrument is sealed with the common seal, attestation is required. 104 It is proposed that -like corporations aggregate -the seal should be abolished and execution by one designated officer should be sufficient. In the case of general partnership, each partner signs as an individual. In the case of all three, a deed does not need to make it clear on its face that it is a deed. However, it must be sealed and delivered, save in the case of the duchy of Lancaster where this was never necessary. 106 It is proposed that, in these instances, the modern practice of signing should be substituted for sealing.
(e) Great Seal & Privy Seal
The Crown (sovereign) may execute documents under the great seal. 107 As to legislation on this matter: The wording in italics would seem otiose, today. The Crown Office Act 1877 provides for the great and privy seals to be in a wafer form, viz.
A Committee of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, consisting of the Lord Chancellor of Great Britain for the time being, the Lord Privy Seal for the time being, and one of Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State (in this Act referred to as the Committee of Council), acting in case of difference according to the opinion of any two of them, may from time to time direct impressions with the same device as the Great Seal and of the Privy Seal to be taken in such manner and of such size or sizes as they may from time to time prescribe, on embossed paper, wax, wafer, or any other material; and any such impressions, in this Act respectively called a Wafer Great Seal and a Wafer Privy Seal, shall be in the same custody as the seals of which they are impressions, and when attached to or embossed on any document required to be or usually authenticated by or passed under the Great Seal or Privy Seal, they shall confer on that document the same validity in all respects as if the document itself had been authenticated by or passed under the Great Seal or Privy Seal. 113 It is asserted that all these pieces of legislation should be repealed and a modern formulation of them should be inserted into a Formalities Act (including all of the Crown Office Act 1877), see Appendix A.
In conclusion, sealing should be abolished and the signature employed for corporations sole and aggregate -as well as other legal persons -with execution by one designated officer (or, at most, two) being a sufficient formal prerequisite.
110 Section 8, 'It shall continue to be lawful for Her Majesty from time to time under Her Royal Sign Manual to appoint a fit person to fill the office of clerk of the Crown in Chancery. The clerk of the Crown in Chancery shall continue to perform the duties of the office of keeper or clerk of the hanaper... There shall be paid to any person appointed ...to be clerk of the Crown in Chancery such salary as the Treasury may assign to him. The salaries of the clerk of the Crown in Chancery, and of his officers, and the expenses of his office, shall be paid out of moneys provided by Parliament.' 111 Section 9, 'The Lord Chancellor, with the concurrence of the Treasury, may from time to time by order appoint the fees to be taken in the office of or by the clerk of the Crown in Chancery, or by any of his officers, or by any person performing the duties of messenger or pursuivant of the Great Seal, or gentleman of the chamber attending the Great Seal, or purse-bearer to the Lord Chancellor, or chaff wax sealer or deputy sealer, and may from time to time by order increase, reduce, add to, or abolish the fees for the time being taken in such office or by such officer...No fees other than those so appointed shall be taken in the said office or by any of the above mentioned officers or persons.' 112 Section 2(2), 'The Lord Chancellor may from time to time make, and when made revoke and vary, regulations respecting the passing of instruments under the Great Seal of the [UK], and respecting the warrants for that purpose, and the preparation of such instruments and warrants, and every such warrant shall be prepared by the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery. (3) No person shall make or prepare any warrant for passing any instrument under the Great Seal of the [UK], or procure any instrument to be passed under that Seal otherwise than in manner provided by this Act or the Crown Office Act 1877; and any person who acts in contravention of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.' One would suggest that the criminal offence in (3) (for which no penalty is provided) is no longer required. 113 See s 4. Also, s 5 which provides for rules to be made as to the wafer seal: 'The Committee of Council aforesaid, acting in case of difference according to the opinion of any two of them, may by order make, and when made from time to time revoke, add to, or alter rules -(2) prescribing the documents to which the Wafer Great Seal and the Wafer Privy Seal respectively are to be attached; and (3) prescribing the mode in which documents to which this Act applies are to be prepared, whether to be printed or written, or partly printed and partly written, and whether to be printed or written on paper, parchment, or any other fitting material: provided that (a) it shall not be necessary to the validity of any document to or on which a Wafer Great Seal or Wafer Privy Seal is attached or embossed to prove that the attachment or embossing of such wafer seals respectively was authorised and no evidence to the contrary shall be received....(c) Any rule purporting to be made in pursuance of this section shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament.' Section 3(b) is spent.'
CONCLUSION -DEEDS, SPECIALTIES & SEALS
Deeds, specialties and seals should be abolished, in order to recognise the supremacy of the signature. Further, the methods by which legal documents are validly executed should be set out in a Formalities Act, something the London Law Society advocated in 1998 (one could not have put it better):
We strongly support the insertion of any relevant new legislation into a single set of statutory provisions which can easily be referred to and understood by the legal profession. 114 Further, this should not be difficult, see Appendix A. As well as deeds, specialties and seals, other formal requirements for the execution of a legal document should also be dealt with in a Formalities Act. These are now considered.
POWERS OF ATTORNEY
At present, powers of attorney are regulated by the Powers of Attorney Act 1971. This Act was amended by the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 to require a power of attorney to be by way of deed. 115 If deeds are abolished, such will no longer apply and the rather confusing wording in the Powers of Attorney Act 1971 should be re-stated. Given that other sections of this Act are spent -it would be of great utility to lawyers (and to others) if a Formalities Act were to re-state the Powers of Attorney 1971 as well as to consolidate it with the Powers of Attorney (Northern Ireland) Act 1971 and the Evidence and Powers of Attorney Act 1940.
In conclusion, all legislation on powers of attorney (except enduring powers of attorney) should be placed in a Formalities Act.
NOTARISATION (a) Activities of a Notary
Unlike in civil law systems, notarising legal documents is uncommon in England and Wales. 116 This formality is (usually) only employed when it is needed for foreign purposes. Or, when legislation requires it. It seems there are no instances where the common law mandates notarisation. This, probably, results from a general distrust of the civil law which the common law has long retained. However, many of these activities have been taken over by law firms or they are (effectively) obsoleteespecially those referred to in italics. 
(b) Statutory Requirements for Notarisation
The only statutory requirement for notarisation (it seems) is the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 (the 'BEA 1882') which codified the law on bills of exchange. 120 The BEA 1882 distinguishes between inland 121 and foreign bills. The former is effectively obsolete -save as to cheques -122 and inland bills should be abolished (apart from in the case of cheques). That is, persons should be prevented from creating inland bills of exchange. As it is, a bill which is not an inland bill is categorised as a foreign bill. Brooke's Notary observes:
A foreign bill differs from an inland bill in the respect that if dishonoured it must be protested, whereas a dishonoured inland bill generally needs no protest in order for an action to be founded on it.
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When a foreign bill is dis-honoured by non acceptance -or non payment -the holder of the bill acquires a right of action against the drawer of the bill as well as any indorser(s). However, for the right to be enforceable, not only must notice of dishonour be given, for a foreign bill, it must be protested. Notice of dishonour is a formal notice. This is subject to exceptions, 124 dispensations 125 and exemptions. 126 As for protesting, a component of this is noting the same. 127 The protest is a formal procedure, as described in Brooke's Notary:
In order for this to be done it must be taken to a notary who, at a reasonable hour of the day on which it is dishonoured, or the next succeeding business day, will, having first made an exact copy of the bill, present it a second time to the drawee (in the case of a protest for non-acceptance) or to the person designated by the bill as payer at the proper place as determined by the [BEA 1882] (in the case of protest for non-payment) and make a formal demand for its acceptance or payment, as the case may be.
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However, this protest procedure is, often, short circuited (that is, speeded up) by the notary not presenting for acceptance (or payment) a second time where dishonour is otherwise certain. 129 Further, there is no prescribed form of protest. Also, protest is not required in any situation where a notice of dishonour is not required.
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 It is also possible to protest a bill (whether foreign or inland) for better security where the acceptor of a bill becomes bankrupt or insolvent or it suspends payment before the bill matures. 131 However, such is rare (the expenses of the protest being irrecoverable and protest for better security not being a legal requirement, even in the case of a foreign bill); a computerised one and a notary is not involved. See McBain, n 1, p 93. So too, in respect of debenture stock and share ballots. Ibid, p 94. In the case of (k), the presence of a notary is also uncommon today. 120 Bills of exchange, which probably originated in Italy in the 12 th century (if not earlier), enable debts to be settled by means of a piece of paper. A bill of exchange which satisfies the prerequisites of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 is legally enforceable. One of the benefits of the bill of exchange is that it is negotiable. Thus, the debt represented by the bill can be transferred. 121 Inland bills comprise those which are (or which purport to be) drawn and payable in the British Islands or which are drawn in the British islands on a person resident there. British islands means any part of the UK including the Isle of Man, Guernsey, Jersey, Aldernay and Sark and the islands adjacent to any of them, being part of the dominions of Her Majesty. See McBain Notaries, n 1, p 96 and BEA 1882, s 4. 122 Inland bills drawn by individuals and legal persons were displaced by cheques (i.e. inland bills drawn on a bank) and, in the 20 th century, by electronic payment systems which are much cheaper, faster, less legally complex and less susceptible to fraud. Doubtless, cheques will also, soon, become obsolete (or will be abolished as a payment mechanism) for the same reason. 123 McBain Notaries, n 1, p 96 referring to Brooke's Notary, n 21, p 113 (emphasis added). In fact, inland bills were not legally required to be protested and they were (and are) not, in practice. The BEA 1882 placed in legislation protest at common law, which also existed in Scotland, see Ars Notariatus (1740), n 1, pp 241-2. 124 If the bill is dis-honoured it is unnecessary to give notice of a subsequent refusal by non-payment, unless the bill has been accepted in the meantime. McBain Notaries, n 1, p 97. 125 It is not required: (a) when, after the exercise of reasonable diligence, it cannot be given to (or does not reach) the party to be charged; or (b) it has been expressly (or impliedly) waived by the party entitled to it (i.e. the defaulter). McBain Notaries, n 1, p 97. 126 Notice of dishonor vis-à-vis the drawer of a bill is unnecessary when: (i) the drawer and drawee are the same person; (ii) the drawee is fictitious or a person lacking the capacity to contract; (iii) the drawer is a person to whom the bill is presented for payment; or (iv) the drawee (or acceptor) is, as between himself and the drawer, under no obligation to accept (or pay) the bill; or (v) the drawer has countermanded payment. See McBain Notaries, n 1, p 97. 127 The noting of the bill is the making of a note (or minute) on the face of the bill, this comprising: (i) the notary's initials; (ii) the date of noting; (iii) the noting charges; and (iv) a reference to a mark (or number) in the notary's register in which the notary records all bills (and promissory notes) which he has noted. 128 McBain Notaries, n 1, p 99. 129 As Brooke's Notary notes, if a holder of a bill is sure it will be dishonoured -to save time and money -instead of the bill being formally presented for acceptance (or payment) the notary will ignore this and present the bill in the ordinary way. If dishonoured (rejected) he will then re-present it notarially. See McBain, n 1, p 99. 130 McBain, n 1, p 100.  Finally, it is possible for there to be acceptance and payment for honour supra protest. This, where a third party agrees -after the protest of a foreign (or an inland) bill -to step in to accept liability on the bill in place of the defaulter, after protest. This is also (very) rare, since third parties, generally, do not want to guarantee the credit of others in such a situation.
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In conclusion, foreign (but not inland) bills of exchange must be noted and protested.
(c) Abolishing Noting & Protest -Foreign Bills
The noting and protest of a foreign bill is an arcane and administratively time consuming procedure (as well as incurring notarial fees) in the nature of a 'blast from the past'. It had some purpose in medieval Italian times, 133 when it was designed to embarrass a party into paying up. As Brooke's Notary states:
The origin of protesting dishonoured bills lies in medieval Italian commercial practice. The dishonoured bill was taken to the house of the merchant who failed to honour his commitments and, as his door was knocked, a protest was made publicly about the defaulter's miscreance. 134 Thus, there was -in early times -no legal purpose to the noting and protest of a foreign bill. Rather, it was a process of naming and shaming a person (an individual) into paying his debt since his social and commercial creditworthiness were publicly impugned. Today, this rationale has gone. Today, foreign bills are drawn (if at all) by legal persons in large offices without neighbours to be interested in their credit. There are other reasons why this requirement for foreign bills should be dispensed with:  Inland Bills. Noting and protest is not legally required in the case of inland bills (and was rare in practice, anyway) and this has never had an adverse effect;  Promissory Notes & Cheques. The BEA 1882 has never required noting in the case of promissory notes (whether inland or foreign). Nor in the case of cheques -since they are, invariably, treated as (or are) inland bills. 135 Nor, in practice, are the same (i.e. promissory notes and cheques) noted or protested;
 Noting & Protest -Foreign Bills. Noting and protest is not required where a notice of dishonour is not required and the latter is subject to various exceptions, dispensations and exemptions (see (b) ). Further, noting and protest is only required where the foreign bill appears to be such on its face. However, this is rare for cheques and for many bills that would, otherwise, be treated as foreign bills;
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 Volume of Foreign Bills. This is much less than in the past, given faster and more efficient payment methods. Thus, the need to note and protest has declined and such, anyway, is rare -most foreign bills being honoured in practice. Acceptance and payment supra protest are also (very) rare and, thus, noting and protesting against a third party who does not pay up, is also (very) rare;  No Legal Benefit of Noting & Protesting. Although required by the BEA 1882 for foreign bills, noting and protest does not, actually, accord any additional benefit to a holder vis-a-vis the defaulter;  Legal Detriment of not Noting. A holder who fails to note and protest a foreign bill incurs real legal detriment in that it cannot, then, enforce the bill against the drawer (or any indorser). 137 This is draconian -especially when noting and protesting are not required for any legal reason as such -but, rather, it is a practical remedy (of trying to enforce payment by publicly embarrassing a person into it). Today, it is asserted that it is an unjust legal formalism to compulsorily require noting and protest since the result may be to negate the debt when the creditor fails to perform a formal requirement that no longer has a purposive element. One, additionally, which was intended for its benefit. Thus, the compulsory requirement of noting and protest can (at times) wholly prejudice the very party whom this process was designed to assist -the creditor (the holder of the bill). 132 See BEA 1882, ss 65 & 68. See also McBain, n 1, pp 101-2. 133 Likely, the concept of bills of exchange arrived in England from Italian practices. Kings such as Edward I (1272-1307), Edward II (1307-27) and Edward III (1327-77) depended heavily on Italian financiers after Jewish people were expelled from England in 1290. 134 McBain, n 1, p 99. 135 As noted in Ellinger's, Modern Banking Law (2011), pp 421-42 'In practice… 'noting' and 'protesting' a cheque should rarely arise as the vast majority of cheques are drawn by UK residents on UK banks and accordingly are 'inland bills', even if the payee happens to reside abroad.' Also, cheques are not presented for acceptance but for payment.Thus, noting and protest for the former do not occur anyway. McBain, n 1, p 103. 136 See McBain, n 1, p 104 fn 82 referring to Elllinger, see n 135 'unless there is some indication on the face of the cheque that it is a 'foreign bill' (such as an indication that it was drawn abroad), then the holder is entitled to treat the cheque as an 'inland bill'. 137 BEA 1882, s 51(2) 'if it be not so protested the drawer and indorsers are discharged. ' The Jack Committee Report on Banking Services in 1989 recommended that compulsory noting and protest be abolished but that it be possible to make a voluntary protest via the issue of a simple certificate of the facts given by anyone entitled to take an oath -and not just notaries. 138 This was supported by a Government White Paper in 1990. 139 It should be observed, however, that the Jack Committee's Report and the Government White Paper were predicated on the notion that the Uncitral Convention 1988 (which provided for mandatory protest) would come in force in England and Wales. 140 This has not occurred since this Convention is not in force. In any case, the UK is not a signatory to this Convention. 141 More particularly, both the Report and the White Paper stated that:
Noting and protest...is, under the [BEA 1882], required only for a foreign bill, because some courts overseas will not accept that the bill has [otherwise] been dishonoured either by non-acceptance or nonpayment. 142 This is incorrect since the noting and protest of a foreign bill was not due to this under English law. Rather, it was the adoption of the Italian medieval practice of embarrassing a party into payment. 143 Further, in any case, parties could (if mandatory noting and protest, as required by the BEA 1882, was abolished) provide evidence to a foreign court (if needed) of the bill being dishonoured by way of a notarised certificate of demand or such other form that would satisfy the relevant local law.
(d) Conclusion
The only statutory provision in legislation for the formality of notarisation appears to be contained in the BEA 1882. This, in respect of the noting and protest of foreign bills. If the relevant sections of the BEA 1882 re noting and protest were repealed as unnecessary -as well as those relating to protest for better security and acceptance (or payment) for honour supra protest -no distinction between inland and foreign bills is required (albeit, inland bills should also be abolished, save for cheques). More importantly, repeal of these sections of the BEA 1882 will help clarify when notarisation is required under English law.
In conclusion, a Formalities Act should abolish any common law requirement for notarisation (although there would appear to be none anyway). Sections of the BEA 1882 relating to noting and protest (as well as to acceptance and payment for honour supra protest) should be repealed.
LEGALISATION (CONSULARISATION)
Legalisation is also, sometimes, called 'consularisation 'or 'apostillization.' 144 This comprises a formality in which the diplomatic (or consular) agent of the country in which a legal document is produced, certifies:
 the authenticity of the signature on the legal document;
 the capacity in which the person signing the legal document has acted;  (where appropriate) the identity of the seal (or stamp) it bears.
The above is stated in the Hague Convention of 5 October 1961 (the 'Hague Convention'), article 2, which Convention the UK has ratified.  The Hague Convention abolished the requirement for the legalisation of public documents (which are defined to include notarial acts) executed in the territory of one Contracting State (which includes the UK) and required to be produced in the territory of another Contracting State; 138 McBain, n 1, p 106. 139 White Paper, 'Banking Services: Law and Practice (March, 1990), Cm 1026, Annex 6, paras 6.6. & 6.7 'Noting and protest are procedures for providing formal proof that a bill of exchange has been presented and dishonoured. Protesting is mandatory under the 1882 Act for foreign bills because some overseas courts will not otherwise accept that a bill has been dishonoured. The Government proposes to abolish the mandatory requirement for noting and protesting a dishonoured foreign bill. However, this procedure would be retained in a slightly modified form for use on a voluntary basis. Anyone entitled to take an oath would be able to give a simple certificate of the facts in order to fulfil the requirements in those countries where noting and protesting are still required.' 140 UN Convention on International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes 1988, arts 60-3 relate to protest and art 60(3) relates to a declaration. 141 Only Gabon, Guinea, Honduras, Liberia and Mexico have acceded to it to date.
142 McBain Notaries, n 1, p 106.
143 See text to n 134. 144 The word 'apostillization' only applies where the Hague Convention 1961 applies. However, it is possible for the British consulate to issue a certificate where the Hague Convention does not apply. Thus, 'consularization' tends to be used here. Although 'legalisation' was replaced by the apostille, the word is still in common use to (generically) refer to any consular certification, whether under the Hague Convention or not.
 Pursuant to this Convention, 'legalisation' was replaced by a simpler process of adding to the document a certificate (called an 'apostille') issued by the competent authority of the State from which the document emanated.
Only documents issued by a public notary (or some other public official) from the country from which the document derives are capable of being legalised. However, some embassies (or consulates) are prepared to append legalisations to private signatures. The Convention does not impose a requirement of legalisation where it does not otherwise exist.
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Brooke's Notary states:
Legalisation is rarely necessary in the case of documents executed in the United Kingdom and intended for use in a Commonwealth country, but is a frequent requirement if the document is to be used elsewhere.
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However, the Hague Convention does not require legalisation where English legislation does not otherwise require. As it is, this process of legalisation/consularisation is relatively clear. Thus, it is asserted that no provision as to its modernisation need be made in a Formalities Act.
In conclusion, legalisation (consularisation, apostillization) does not need not to be dealt with in a Formalities
Act.
ATTESTATION (a) Nature of Attestation
Attestation is a formal requirement. It is not the same as witnessing, since (as the concept is understood in modern times) attestation requires the person witnessing to also be physically present when the document was executed. Attestation means a witness signs a legal document following a statement (an attestation clause) that the legal document was signed, or executed, by the maker in his presence. Thus, in Wickham v Marquis of Bath (1865), 147 Romilly MR stated that attestation meant that:
one or more persons are present at the time of the execution for that purpose and that as evidence thereof they sign the attestation clause, stating such execution.
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The witness must see the maker sign the instrument.
(b) Legal Requirement of Attestation
In Anglo-Saxon and Norman times, charters (deeds) were executed in the presence of a number of witnesses. They did not sign the document, however, although there was a form of 'attestation clause'. 150 Since this was without the signature of the witness it was not the same as the modern concept of attestation. From the time of Henry VIII (1509-47), witnesses tended, in practice, to sign at the bottom (or on the back) of the deed -the deed being the prevailing form of legal document.
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 Attestation was not a common law prerequisite for a deed however -although, in practice, many deeds were attested. 152 Thus, for a deed, attestation was not required until the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989. This provided that a legal document was only validly executed as a deed by an individual if signed by him in the presence of a witness who attested his signature (or at his direction and in his presence and the presence of two witnesses who each attested his signature); 145 Ready, n 21, pp 244-5 'It is important to note that the Convention does not introduce a requirement for the affixing of an apostille where no requirement for legalization would otherwise exist. Thus, although many Commonwealth countries are parties to the Convention, it is rarely necessary that a public document issued in the [UK] for use in such a country will require the addition of an apostille, since the courts in most Commonwealth countries take judicial notice of the signatures and seals of notaries public and officials in the [UK] . It should also be noted that the embassies and consulates of a number of countries continue to provide legalization services notwithstanding that the Convention is in force in those countries. The validity of such legalizations is not affected by the Convention.' 146 Ibid, p 244. 149 See also McBain Deeds, n 1, pt 1, p 53. 150 It was 'hiis testibus' ('these being witnesses'). See McBain Deeds, n 1, pt 1, pp 23-4. 151 Blackstone, n 13, vol 2, p 308 who noted that the reign of Henry VIII was also the era of 'discontinuing it [i.e. the hiis testibus clause] in the deeds of subjects, learning being then revived, and the faculty of writing more general; and therefore ever since that time the witnesses have subscribed their attestation, either at the bottom, or on the back, of the deed.' See also McBain Deeds, n 1, pt 1, pp 23-4. 152 See McBain Deeds, n 1, pt 1, p 30.
 In 1989, the Powers of Attorney Act 1971 was amended to require a power of attorney to be in the form of a deed. Thus, attestation was also required in the case of an individual making the same.
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As for legislation, the first legislation requiring attestation was the Statute of Frauds 1677, requiring wills to be attested 154 (see also, later, the present Wills Act 1837, s 9). 155 From the Victorian era, provision was made for attestation and a variety of pieces of legislation and statutory instruments today refer to need to attest various documents. 156 In the case of attestation by corporations aggregate, in the case where a legal document is sealed, it may be asserted that the witnesses who sign the legal document, as such, are not attesting the seal (i.e. attesting the execution of the document by the attachment of the seal in their presence). Rather, they are 'authenticating' the seal.
(c) Problems with Attestation
Legislation making attestation a legal requirement has introduced a (considerable) problem where there was none before.
 When the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 introduced, as a substantive requirement (a prerequisite), attestation in order for an individual to execute a deed, the Law Commission recommended this on the basis of 4 arguments: viz. (i) it would distinguish deeds from mere signed documents; (ii) it would emphasise to the person executing the importance of his act; (iii) it would give rise to an evidential presumption of due execution; (iv) it might assist in the prevention or (at least) the detection, of forgery;
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 However, (i) and (ii), relate to deeds (and they fall by the wayside if deeds are abolished). As to (iii), such a presumption was never enacted. As to (iv), there is no evidence that attestation thwarts this. If persons are determined to forge documents -such as deeds, wills and powers of attorney -they can (easily) forge the signatures of people attesting (or witnessing, for that matter) the same or they can get dishonest attestators (or witnesses) to assist. Further, attestation can have the effect of invalidating a legal document on the basis of a technical formality, in circumstances where this is, often, unjust.
In the case of Shah v Shah (1982) , 159 the Court of Appeal was not prepared to invalidate a document even though it had not been attested. Here, a signature by an individual to a deed was witnessed by a person but not attested, since that person was not physically present when the individual executed the deed, as required by the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989. The Court of Appeal rejected the contention that the deed was, thereby, rendered invalid and held that the signatory was estopped from so asserting. Pill LJ stated:
The perceived need for formality in the case of a deed requires a signature and a document cannot be a deed in the absence of a signature. I can detect no social policy which requires the person attesting the signature to be present when the document is signed. The attestation is at one stage removed from the imperative out of which the need for formality arises. It is not fundamental to the public interest, which is in the requirement for a signature. Failure to comply with the additional formality of attestation should not in itself prevent a party into whose possession an apparently valid deed has come from alleging that the signatory should not be permitted to rely on the absence of attestation in his presence. It should not permit a person to escape the consequences of an apparently valid deed he has signed, 153 The amendment was made by the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 to the Powers of Attorney Act 1971. 154 Statute of Frauds 1677 (19 Car 2 c 3), s 6 'in the presence of three or four witnesses, declaring the same.' 155 Section 9 provides,'No will shall be valid unless - (a) it is in writing, and signed by the testator, or by some other person in his presence and by his direction; and (b) it appears that the testator intended by his signature to give effect to the will; and (c) the signature is made or acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two or more witnesses present at the same time; and (d) each witness either -(i) attests and signs the will; or (ii) acknowledges his signature, in the presence of the testator (but not necessarily in the presence of any other witness), but no form of attestation shall be necessary.' 156 For pieces of legislation requiring it in Victorian times see JP Taylor, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence (1878), paras 1840-1 and McBain Deeds, n 1, pt 1, p 54, n 444. As to those pieces of general legislation and SI that require attestation today, these may be determined by conducting a wordsearch in the Government's Statute Law Database (www.legislation.giv.uk) as well as from the commercial legislation databases of publishers such as Butterworths (LexisNexis), Thompson Reuters (Westlaw), Hein Online etc. A wordsearch of the word 'attest' refers to some 200 general statutes or statutory instruments. However, in a number of these, the word 'attest' is not a reference to the legal formality of attestation. Given their prevalence though, it would be useful for a Formalities Act to cancel all requirements for attestation from all legislation (general, local and private) as well as from all constitutional documents and internal regulations of all corporations aggregate in respect of legal documents. See Appendix A. 157 See McBain Deeds, n 1, pt 1, pp 30 & 54. 158 Ibid, pt 2, pp 12 & 26. See also the purposes for the formalities for the execution of legal documents in 2, viz, to (i) prevent fraud; (ii) to help evidence a transaction; and (iii) to require parties to consider the terms of the legal document before executing it. 159 [2002] QB 35. See also McBain Deeds, n 1, pt 2, pp 12 & 26. representing that he has done so in the presence of an attesting witness, merely by claiming that in fact the attesting witness was not present at the time of the signature. The fact that the requirements are partly for the protection of the signatory makes it less likely that Parliament intended that the need for them could in all circumstances be used to defeat the claim of another party.
Having regard to the purposes for which deeds are used and indeed, in some cases required, and the long term obligations which deeds will often create, there are policy reasons for not permitting a party to escape his obligations under the deed by reason of a defect, however minor, in the way his signature was attested. The possible adverse consequences if a signatory could, months or years later, disclaim liability upon a purported deed, which he had signed and delivered, on the mere ground that his signature had not been attested in his presence, are obvious. The lack of proper attestation will be peculiarly within the knowledge of the signatory and, as Sir Christopher Slade observed in the course of argument, will often not be within the knowledge of the other parties. 160 This reasoning seems (eminently) sensible and it is likely the same reason why judges in earlier times did not make the attestation of a deed a prerequisite. It would have meant that parties could deliberately not have attested deeds (or have attested them defectively) in order to invalidate the deed later. 161 This case shows that attestation should not be required by statute unless there are very good reasons for it.
(d) Case of Briggs (2015)
The further problem with attestation may be seen in the case of Briggs and others v Gleeds (Head Office) (a firm) and Others (2015) . 162 Here, an individual signed the deed. However, there was no attestation at all as required by the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989. In this case Newey J distinguished Shah v Shah (1982) on the basis that -in that case -the deeds were 'apparently valid' since a person had subsequently added their name to the deed, to witness the maker's signature (but had not been present when the maker had signed and, thus, had not attested). Thus, estoppel was appropriate, but not where there was no attestation at all (Newey J thought Pill LJ would have come to the same conclusion). 163 The problem with both Shah (1982) and Briggs (2015) is that they draw ever more nuanced distinctions on the theme of 'what is attestation' ? If witnessed it isif the witness is not physically present but, later, signs. 164 But, if not even witnessed (or, possibly, if the witness is present but does not sign), it is not. 165 Indeed, Newey J, himself may have been confused as to the difference between attestation and witnessing since -in his judgment -he referred to witnessing when he meant attestation. 166 Also, Briggs (2015) gives rise to some curiosities:
 In this case, even if not deeds, the relevant legal documents were signed and, thus, instruments under hand, which do not need to be attested. 167 Thus, it seems that they were enforceable as instruments under hand. Also, at least, some of the relevant legal documents were stated to be sealed by the makers of the same (who were various partners). 168 Thus, even if not deeds, they could have been specialities (assuming that a specialty is not, now, a synonym for a deed) and enforced as such. Further, if not specialities (which seems, may be limited to debt obligations), they could have been instruments under seal, and enforced as such. These issues were (it seems) not explored in this case;  The fact that a legal document declares itself to be a 'deed' does not, in law, make it such since this is a matter for a court to conclude as a proposition of law. 169 Therefore, the fact that, in this case, the legal documents declared themselves to be deeds is not conclusive and a court can hold that they were, in fact, something else.
Another problem is that a convicted forger or a child of five or a beneficiary of a deed, can all attest. Further, no attestation clause, as such, is generally required. Thus, all a party needs to do, in most instances, is to be present at the execution of the legal document as a witness and write their name on the legal document. 
What should be done as to attestation? It is asserted that this formality is unduly onerous as a compulsory legal
WITNESSING (a) Practice of Witnessing until 1677
From Biblical times, the witnessing of commercial transactions -especially the delivery of land and goods by way of sale, exchange (barter), gift and pledge -was an integral part of the transaction. Since most people were illiterate, they did not attest by attaching their signature. In Anglo-Saxon times, charters/deeds were executed in the presence of a number of witnesses who did not sign the instrument but were recorded as such, their names being subscribed to the charter (hiis testibus).
170 After the Norman Conquest third parties were, often, called to witness the delivery of seisin or the delivery of the deed and Bracton (c. 1250) recommended it.
171 At least two witnesses would be present in accordance with precepts in the Bible and old Anglo-Saxon law. 172 Again, in post Conquest times, the witnesses did not subscribe their signature (i.e. attest). However, their names were recorded in the charter, as Blackstone noted:
They registered in the deed the persons who attended as witnesses, which was formerly done without their signing their names (that not being always in their power) but they only heard the deed read; and then the clerk or scribe added their names, in a sort of memorandum; thus, hiis testibus, Johanne Moore, Jacobo Smith, et aliis ad hanc rem convocatis [these being witnesses, John Moore, Jacob Smith and other witnesses being present at this matter].
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This clause -often, called an attestation clause -was not the same as our modern one since the witnesses did not sign as such. In conclusion, in early times -including with deeds -legal documents were witnessed. However, the witnesses did not sign (attest) and witnessing was not a common law requirement. That is, it did not invalidate the transaction (including a deed) if lacking, although it was almost invariable in practice. In the time of Henry VIII (1509-47), the practice of signing had revived. Thus, the hiis testibus ('in witness whereof') clause was discontinued and witnesses attested, by signing as such on the legal document (invariably, a deed).
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Although this new practice prevailed, a deed still did not require witnessing (or attestation) to be valid as Goodard's Case (1584) noted. 175 The Statute of Frauds 1677, s 5 required a will to be attested but not deeds or other legal documents -including commercial paper such as bills of exchange (including cheques), promissory notes and bonds (in early times called obligations) etc. witness thereof' ). However, this was not a pre-requisite. 171 Bracton, n 5, vol 2, p 119.'Witnesses ought to be called and let everything be done in their presence with due ceremony, that they may verify what was done if required to do so, and their names included in the charter. If they are not present at the making of the charter it is sufficient if it is afterwards read and approved in their presence, both donor and donee being present…and better still if all is done in a public place, as in the county or hundred court, so that if the gift is denied it may more readily be proved.' See also McBain Deeds, n 1, pt 1, p 21. 172 See n 103. 173 Blackstone, n 13, vol 2, p 307. See also McBain Deeds, n 1, p 21. 174 Coke, n 36, vol 1, s 1 (Co Litt 6(a)) 'And lastly, antiquity did add hiis testibus in the continent [body] of the deed after the in cuius rei testimonium, written with the same hand that the deed was, which witnesses were called the deed read, and then their names entered....which clause of hiis testibus...continued until the reign of H 8 [Henry VIII, 1509-47] but now is wholly omitted.' See also Blackstone, n 13, vol 2, p 308. Henoted that the reign of Henry VIII was the era of discontinuing hiis testibus clause in deeds 'learning being then revived, and the faculty of writing more general; and therefore ever since that time the witnesses have subscribed their attestation, either at the bottom, or on the back, of the deed.' See also McBain Deeds, n 1, pt 1, p 40. 175 2 Co Rep 4b at 5a (76 ER 396). 'There are but three things of the essence and substance of a deed, that is to say, writing in paper or parchment, sealing and delivery, and if it hath these three, although it wanted, in cuius rei testimonium sigillum suum apposuit, [in witness whereof he put his seal] yet the deed is sufficient.' See also McBain Deeds, n 1, pt 1, pp 23-4. 176 McBain Deeds, n 1, pt 1, p 24. For Scotland, see Ars Notariatus, n 1, p 50.
(b) Conclusion
Prior to 1677, witnessing (or attesting) a legal document was not a legal requirement at common law. The Statute of Frauds 1677 required wills to be attested. However, it did not require any legal document to be witnessed. In 1989, deeds were required to be attested in the case of individuals (this is also a requirement in the case of a power of attorney if the donor is an individual). If deeds, specialties and the seal are abolished, then, it should be clarified that any common law requirement to witness is abolished (simply, confirming that there is, actually, no such requirement, for the sake of good order). Further, any requirement to witness pursuant to any legislation, should be repealed. The only legal document that should have a mandatory requirement to be witnessed should be a will -if that. 177 The reason for this, is that an otherwise perfectly valid legal document should not be invalidated simply by reason of it not being witnessed; this is draconian. Further, in practice, legal documents will, undoubtedly, continue to be witnessed (and attested). Thus, little will change.
In conclusion, no legal document should be compulsorily required to be witnessed -whether as a matter of common law or legislation. Witnessing should remain optional, with the possible exception of a will.
OATHS & DECLARATIONS
An oath is a formality. So too, is a legal declaration. Indeed, the oath -even prior to the seal -was the means by which a person, in ancient times, declared himself to be bound. As well as consolidation, these sections (there are few) should be modernised, see Appendix A. Indeed, one would suggest that it is essential that such material be placed in a Formalities Act in order to modernise and consolidate all formalities, instead of them being 'all over the shop' as at present.
WRITING
In Anglo-Saxon times as well as in medieval England, the word -and not the written word -predominated, since most of the population could not read or write. Thus, even though deeds required writing, the execution of most commercial transactions in markets and fairs would have been effected by a handshake, a drink to seal the bargain or another form of token, including the payment of money.
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 The result was that English common law did not require legal documents to be in writing, apart from a deed which had to be in writing (on parchment or paper), sealed and delivered. Even a will could be oral;  This continues, in part, until today. Legal transactions such as a sale or an exchange (barter) or a gift (including a donatio mortis causa) do not have to be in writing in order to be valid. Nor does a pledge or a mortgage have to be in writing at common law, although they (invariably) are, not least since mortgages are usually registered.
This leaves uncertain what the common law (as opposed to legislation) stipulates must be in writing in order for the act to be legally valid. It is asserted that it would be useful to all lawyers (and laymen) to clarify this -as well as to remove the statutory anomaly as to a guarantee. This is required to be (or evidenced) in writing by the Statute of Frauds 1677, s 4 -whereas an indemnity may be oral. These matters are now considered, the common law reference being to 'instruments under hand', that is legal documents which are signed, as opposed to being sealed.
(a) Common Law Requirement
It is difficult to find any compulsory requirements for instruments under hand (excluding deeds which have always required writing) to be in writing by the common law -as opposed to legislation. Halsbury notes the following:  Appointments of Property and to Offices. Halsbury notes that such are either appointments of: (a) property; or of (b) persons to offices (or other positions); or of (c) trustees or agents. Also, that: (a) were frequently authorised to be made under hand (as well as by deed or will). 180 And, that the 177 The Law Commission is, presently, looking at the modernization of wills. 178 McBain Consideration, n 1, pt 1, pp 14-5. appointment of a new trustee may (usually) be under hand but must, for certain purposes, be by deed. 181 Further, that the appointment of an agent sometimes has to be in writing. 182 Halsbury also cites statutory instances where writing is required; 183  Declarations of Trust & Assignments. Halsbury noted that legislation required that all declarations of trust respecting land (or any interest in the same) had to be evidenced in writing. 184 It also noted that assignments of various things had to be in writing, such as: (a) In respect of these, Halsbury referred to legislation, save for (b);  Assent on Death, Acknowledgments of Title or of Debts. Halsbury refers to legislation in respect of such matters; 185 So too, in respect of Notices in Writing, Appointment of a Guardian, Other Matters required to be in Writing. 186 Given the uncertainty as to the common law position -as well as the fact that there are so few instances 187 and the fact that the caselaw is so old -a Formalities Act should provide that any common law requirement that any legal act is obliged to be in writing, be abolished. In practice, this will change nothing since even those instances cited above are, invariably, in writing (or evidenced in writing).
(b) Guarantees v Indemnities
Indemnities do not have to be in writing. However, anomalously, guarantees do -in accordance with the terms of the elderly Statute of Frauds 1677, section 4. This anomaly has been considered in a long article. 188 Thus, any analysis will not be dealt with here. However, the retention of such an anomaly tends to bring English law into disrepute since such is a positive invitation to a party to a guarantee against whom section 4 is pleaded, to consider perjuring themselves by swearing that what was once a taken to be a guarantee should now be interpreted by a court as an indemnity.
In conclusion, any common law requirement for a legal act to be in writing should be abolished. So too, the Statute of Frauds 1677, section 4.
CONCLUSION
We live in an age where the signature is 'king'. And, where the electronic signature is developing rapidly. Also, where legal formalism has long given way to commercial reality and to a recognition that formal requirements should not be allowed to void otherwise legally valid transactions, unless there are exceedingly good reasons for this. Further, as with Mansfield CJ (1756-88), today's judges are well aware that the law should assist commerce and economic development and not be a via crucis. What should be done, therefore ? The Law Commission (or other experts) should review the law on Deeds, Specialties and Seals (together, since all refer to seals) and issue a report. Thereafter, in a separate report, the Law Commission (or other experts) should consider other formalities for documents (viz. notarisation, attestation, witnessing and the requirement of writing). What should be the outcome ? The following is suggested as providing the greatest assistance for the development of law and commerce -as well as for ensuring certainty, something the Law Commission has noted the need for: 189  Deeds & Specialties.These legal concepts should be abolished. The benefits of a deed in respect of: (a) an extended limitation period (12 years); (b) consideration; and (c) privity, should apply to any legal document. Mansfield CJ proposed this for consideration long ago (Pillans v Mierop, 1765) as did Holdsworth in modern times. And, privity now applies generally to contracts pursuant to legislation (Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999);  Sealing. This should be abolished. 190 As it is, individuals no longer seal. However, now, nor do most corporations sole, partnerships or corporations aggregate, in practice. Sealing should be abolished and all should now sign. The signature of one designated person (or, at most, two) should be sufficient;  Notarisation. Any requirement to notarise any writing at common law should be abolished.
The requirement to note, and protest, foreign bills in the BEA 1882 (including protest for better security, as well as acceptance (or payment) by way of honour supra protest) should be abolished;  Attestation. Any requirement to attest at common law should be abolished and any legislative requirement, repealed. Attestation is too onerous. It was never, in the past, required for a deed (which only required sealing on parchment or paper and delivery). Further, attestation does not prevent or inhibit forgery or fraud per se. Abolishing a compulsory requirement to attest at common law or in legislation will not prevent persons attesting, in practice. However, a failure to do will not invalidate the legal document;  Witnessing. Any requirement to witness at common law should be abolished and any legislative requirement, repealed -with the possible exception of a will. Witnessing was never required for a deed in the past and -as with attestation -it does not prevent or inhibit forgery or fraud per se. Abolishing a compulsory requirement to attest at common law or in legislation will not prevent persons doing this in practice. However, a failure to do will not, then, invalidate the legal document;  Writing. Any requirement of writing at common law should be abolished. The requirement that a guarantee (or any note or memo thereof) must be in writing and signed by the guarantor or his agent), as contained in the Statute of Frauds 1677, s 4, should be repealed;  Amending Legislation. If deeds, specialties and seals are abolished, references to them in legislation should be removed. Also, terms now obsolete such as to 'indentures' and 'deed polls' as well as to 'simple contracts' -which reference will have no meaning if deeds are abolished. 191 A composite removal of all references would seem apposite, see Appendix A.
All the above should be contained in a Formalities Act, so that such matters are gathered together in one place (including material on the great and privy seal as well as in respect of oaths). If this was done, it would clear out the legal detritus (and anomalies) of the centuries and make the law on the formal requirements for the execution of documents fit for the electronic age. 189 McBain Deeds, n 1, pt 1, p 15 citing the Law Commission 'It is a matter of everyday practical importance that the way in which a company or other corporation executes a document that will bind it should be well-known, simple and rational…Any situation where those advising either party [to a deed or other legal document] are left in any uncertainty as to what is a valid method of execution, and so whether a document will be effective, seems to us to be deeply unsatisfactory.' See also (b) by order, make, revoke, add to, or alter rules prescribing the documents to which the Wafer Great Seal and the Wafer Privy Seal are to be attached; provided that it shall not be necessary to the validity of any document to (or on which) a Wafer Great Seal or Wafer Privy Seal is attached (or embossed) to prove that the attachment (or embossing) was authorised and no evidence to the contrary shall be received. Any rule purporting to be made pursuant to this section (b) shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament. 
Royal Sign Manual
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(1) Execution by Her Majesty under the Royal Sign Manual is valid on the subscription of Her signature save where legislation requires otherwise. 
Power of Attorney
Notarisation
(1) Any requirement to notarise a legal document at common law is abolished.
Attestation and Witnessing
(1) Subject to section 6(2), any requirement to attest, or to witness, a legal document:
(a) at common law; or in any (b) legislation; or (c) articles of incorporation; articles of any charter; or other constitutional document, is abolished.
(2) Section 6(1) shall not apply to the Wills Act [2019] .
Writing
(1) Any requirement at common law that a legal document must be in writing to be valid is abolished.
Contracts for the Sale of Land etc. to be made by signed writing
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(1) A contract for the sale or other disposition of an interest in land can only be made in writing and only by incorporating all the terms which the parties have expressly agreed in one document (or, where contracts are exchanged, in each);
